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 Diagnostic errors are responsible for a signiﬁ cant number of 
adverse events. Logical reasoning and good decision-making 
skills are key factors in reducing such errors, but little emphasis 
has traditionally been placed on how these thought processes 
occur, and how errors could be minimised. In this article, we 
explore key cognitive ideas that underpin clinical decision 
making and suggest that by employing some simple strate-
gies, physicians might be better able to understand how they 
make decisions and how the process might be optimised. 
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 Introduction 
 The work of a surgeon is done in the operating theatre. Much 
time and effort is invested in skills training and great attention is 
paid to the operating environment. In contrast, the work of the 
physician is the decision-making process on the ward round. 1 
There is often little instruction about the decision-making 
process and its dangers, and often, little attention is paid to the 
environment where the decision-making process occurs. In the 
USA, it has been estimated that 44,000–98,000 patients die each 
year through medical error, 2 and in the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study, diagnostic errors accounted for 17% of all adverse events. 3 
 Thinking is core to the work of the physician. For American 
physician and philosopher Edmund Pellegrino, the clinical 
encounter defines medical practice. It can be viewed as a series of 
three questions: ‘What is the problem?’, ‘What are the possible 
solutions?’ and ‘What is the best solution for this patient?’ 4 In 
order to answer these questions, one needs to be able to reason 
and evaluate. It is our purpose in this article to explore this 
process, to consider some of the errors that may be encountered, 
and to offer some suggestions as to how we can avoid them. 
 How do we make clinical decisions? 
 Clinical diagnosis is more akin to the work of a detective than 
a scientist. Looking at the diagnostic process in more detail we 
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can break it down into the following steps: 
>  information gathering 
>  hypothesis generation 
>  hypothesis testing 
>  refl ection. 
 Often the term ‘hypothetico-deductive’ is used to describe 
this process. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was clearly fond of the 
idea of deductive reasoning and used the phrase ‘the science of 
deduction’ as chapter headings twice in the Sherlock Holmes 
stories. However, what happens in practice is that physicians 
seek ‘an explanation of a particular fact by finding some salient 
features of the particular that allow it to be explained by some 
more general causative principles,’ a process that the American 
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce described as ‘abduction’. 5 
The following simple examples adapted from Rapezzi, Ferrari 
and Branzi may help to clarify what is meant by the terms. 6 
 Deduction is reasoning from the general to the particular: 
 >  All the marbles in the jar are white. 
 >  These marbles are from the jar. 
 >  Therefore these marbles must be white. 
 Induction is reasoning from the particular to the general: 
 >  These marbles have come from the jar. 
 >  These marbles are white. 
 >  Therefore the marbles in the jar are white. 
 Abduction is more of an inference, an informed guess that fits 
with the known facts: 
 >  The marbles in the jar are white. 
 >  These marbles are white. 
 >  Therefore these marbles have come from the jar. 
 Data gathering 
 The first step in the process is information gathering. To quote 
Holmes ‘it is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. 
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of 
theories to suit facts.’ 7 Carl Trueman notes that history is ‘the 
remembered past’ and, as such, is inevitably shaped by those 
who do the remembering. 8 Patients attempt to understand 
their symptoms, interpreting them within their own frame of 
reference. Also, it is easy to influence the patient by the use of 
leading questions. As a story is rehearsed and repeated it may 
unintentionally change and so it becomes harder to establish 
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the true course of events. We must be careful that we have 
the appropriate data before attempting to draw conclusions. 
As with the history, we must pay attention as we examine the 
patient. In  A scandal in Bohemia , Sherlock Holmes chides 
Dr Watson ‘You see, but you do not observe’. 9 We can be 
blinkered in our perceptions and, if we are not actively seeking 
information, may miss important findings. 
 Hypothesis generation 
 We all use a selection of strategies to produce a list of differential 
diagnoses; varying them depending on the degree of familiarity 
with the condition and the severity of the patient’s illness. 
Canadian emergency physician Pat Croskerry has done much 
work in this area and lists the following common approaches. 10 
 Pattern recognition 
 At its most simplistic level, pattern recognition may seem easy – 
as you hear the first lines of a history, familiar patterns become 
apparent: headache with neck stiffness and photophobia – and 
already the options are starting to line up. Add thunderclap 
onset (or fever) and our pattern is complete. But what of the 
cases where the pattern is incomplete – possibly because we 
have not observed all findings – or if the pattern is unfamiliar? 
Pattern recognition also depends on practice; for an experienced 
clinician, the complex case may seem to fit a pattern. But we can 
get caught out if we do not test our assumptions. 
 Rule out worst case scenarios 
 This approach focuses on risk management but can often leave 
our diagnostic question unanswered. For example, with acute 
chest pain we may exclude many serious differentials but fail to 
reach a definite diagnosis. 
 Casablanca strategy 
 The Casablanca strategy is to ‘round up the usual suspects’. 11 It 
represents the lazy application of a standard battery of tests for a 
given symptom and is somewhat akin to working on autopilot. 12 
 Hypothesis testing and reﬂ ection 
 Malcolm Gladwell’s bestselling book  Blink: the power of 
thinking without thinking popularised the concept of rapid, 
intuitive decision making with its strengths and weaknesses. 13 
Thinking fast and slow by Daniel Kahneman further explores 
and explains this two-system approach to judgment and 
choice. 14 System 1 is fast, automatic, emotional, stereotypic, 
used frequently and operates subconsciously. System 2 is slow, 
effortful, logical, calculating, used infrequently and requires 
conscious thought. In most circumstances, we are better served 
by following a system 2 approach. Strangely, the decision as to 
which system to use rests with system 1, and when we are under 
pressure, we default to system 1 thinking. The dual system 
model is also applicable to medical decision making. 15,16 
 The first step involves data gathering from the history and 
examination (Fig  1 a); this stage also incorporates assessing 
test results. This information forms the basis for hypothesis 
generation. At this point, pattern recognition, rule out worst case 
scenarios, and even the Casablanca strategy come into play. These 
hypothesis-generating steps are not enough: we must examine 
them, refute them if possible and then attempt to also find 
confirmatory data where it can be provided. This whole process is 
the involved, deliberate, analytical, effortful endeavour of system 
2 thinking. We may be tempted to short circuit the process in a 
variety of ways. We may stop if we think we recognise a familiar 
pattern. We may be happy if there is a positive test result, even if 
it does not fit in with the history. Heuristics are mental shortcuts 
that can aid rapid decision making, and are an example of system 
1 thinking that experienced thinkers may use to bypass the 
laborious process of deliberate thought. This approach is not 
without risk. An example where the patient history seems to fit a 
recognisable pattern and, therefore, the clinician has given little 
consideration to other sources of information thus neglecting 
other potential alternative diagnostic hypotheses can be seen in 
Fig  1 b. The clinician jumps straight to confirmatory investigations 
without truly testing his hypothesis. If this works, it may seem 
like diagnostic brilliance but there is great potential for failure. 
Heuristics are often accompanied by biases based on our cognitive 
disposition to respond (CDR). 
Data gathering
History, examinaon, screening tests,
eg ECG bloods
Hypothesis generaon
Paerns recognion, ROWS,
Casablanca strategy
Hypothesis tesng and conﬁrmatory tesng
D-dimer, troponin CT scan, pathology
Reﬂecon/explanaon
Diagnosis
Data gathering
History, examinaon, screening tests
Diagnosis
Heuriscs
History and examinaon
 Faulty data gathering
 • slips and lapses
Hypothesis generaon
 Faulty hypothesis generaon
 • knowledge-based mistakes
Hypothesis tesng
 Faulty hypothesis tesng
 • rule-based mistakes
Reﬂecon/explanaon
 Faulty reﬂecon
 • rule-based mistakes/
    knowledge-based
    mistakes/biases
Diagnosis (possibly incorrect)
CBA
 Fig 1.  The process of medical decision making. A – diagnosic process; B – heuristic thinking bypasses reasoned thought; C – errors are possible at each 
stage of the process. 
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 Where thinking goes wrong 
 As seen in Fig  1 c, errors can occur any at stage. Psychologist 
James Reason identifies three basic error types: skill-based 
(slips and lapses), rule-based and knowledge-based. 17 Skill-
based errors may occur because we get distracted and follow 
a habitual course of action rather than our original plan, 
perhaps intending to follow up on a trainee’s comments about 
a murmur but instead finding ourselves in the usual routine 
of checking blood results and radiology reports. The frequent 
interruptions and distractions of the ward environment 
mean this is not unusual. Rule-based mistakes include the 
misapplication of a good rule or the application of a bad rule. 
One such rule that is often misapplied is that of Occam’s razor, 
which states that ‘entities must not be multiplied beyond 
necessity’. 18 However, one must not ruthlessly discount valid 
alternatives; to apply another rule, ‘patients can have as many 
diseases as they damn well please’ (Hickam’s dictam). 19 
 Knowledge-based mistakes can include lack of appropriate 
information, but can also arise through a lack of understanding 
of the principles of logic. While diagnostic reasoning is not 
purely deduction, we must be able to think logically. Let us for 
a moment consider the use of syllogisms. 20 These are a kind of 
argument using deductive reasoning, based on the relationship 
of two or more propositions that are assumed, or asserted, to be 
true. There are three forms: modus ponens (mode of putting), 
modus tolens (mode of taking) and disjunctive syllogisms (Fig  2 ). 
 At this point, it is worth considering a logical distinction 
between necessary and sufficient causes (Fig  3 ). To quote Carl 
Trueman again ‘a necessary cause is such that, if phenomenon 
B is present, then A must be present too; though the presence 
of A does not necessarily imply that B will occur… a sufficient 
cause is such that A necessarily implies the presence of B, 
but B could be caused by C; thus the presence of B does not 
mean that A is necessarily present’. 8 To make a diagnosis, we 
are seeking the necessary and sufficient explanation for the 
patient’s condition; what lawyers term the ‘necessary elements 
of a sufficient set’. 21 
 Bias and cognitive disposition to respond 
 Errors can arise when we allow biases to distort our thoughts. 
These biases can also be referred to as our CDR. Croskerry lists 
a considerable number of potential CDRs. 10 Order effects mean 
that in receiving information, we pay more attention at the 
beginning and end of a story; meaningful detail in the middle 
can get lost, especially if we do not interrogate all the initial 
information. We may fall prey to the availability heuristic, 
judging things to be more likely if they readily come to mind, 
or we may follow Sutton’s law and look ‘where the money is’ 
(named after Willie Sutton, New York bank robber). Anchoring 
means that we lock into salient features too early. This then 
allows the development of diagnosis momentum: once a label is 
attached, it becomes increasingly sticky. With confirmation bias 
causing us to look for evidence to support our initial diagnosis, 
search satisfying means calling off the search early, potentially 
missing co-pathology. This all results in premature closure 
(accepting a diagnosis before it has been verified). 10 
 Personal factors also come into play. Overconfidence means we 
act on a hunch with incomplete information, relying on opinion 
instead of evidence. Also, there are the sunk costs of following 
a certain line of thought: time, energy and ego. We may exhibit 
social bias in the fundamental attribution error of blaming the 
patient for their diseases, or we may allow our softer side to 
favour diagnoses with better outcomes – so-called outcome bias. 
 A lack of statistical awareness can skew our thinking. Base rate 
neglect means we ignore the true prevalence of disease, inflating or 
neglecting its base rate. The gambler’s fallacy means we are unduly 
influenced by preceding events rather than the true probability of 
an individual occurrence (‘four subarachnoid haemorrhages in a 
row? This one must be migraine’). The opposite of this is posterior 
probability error – just because you have a migraine, doesn’t mean 
you can’t have a subarachnoid bleed. 
 Making better decisions 
 Preparing ourselves 
 Before we consider our reasoning, we must focus on the task at 
hand. Mindfulness is a concept often associated with relaxation 
or stress management. However, it is also relevant to our 
discussion. We must avoid working on autopilot, 12 give our full 
attention to each patient in turn and not allow ourselves to be 
Modus ponens
1. If P then Q
2. P
3. Therefore, Q
Modus tolens
1. If P then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore, not P
Disjuncve syllogism
1. Either P or Q
2. Not P
3. Therefore, Q
Syllogisms
Modus ponens
1. If SAH then 
    xanthochromia
    on CSF
2. SAH
3. Therefore, 
xanthochromia
Modus tolens
1. If SAH then 
    xanthochromia
    on CSF
2. No xanthochromia
3. Therefore, no SAH
Examples
Modus ponens
1. If P then Q
2. P  Q
3. Therefore, Q  P
Aﬃrming the consequence
1. If PE then D-dimer is raised
2. D-dimer is raised
3. Therefore, PE
FallaciesCBA
 Fig 2.  Modus ponens (mode of putting), modus tolens (mode of taking) and disjunctive syllogisms. A – the structure of syllogisms; B – examples of 
syllogisms; C – an example of a common fallacy. CSF = cerebrospinal ﬂ uid; PE = pulmonary embolism; SAH = subarachnoid haemorrhage. 
For pneumonia...
Necessary but not suﬃcient
• air space shadowing on chest 
   X-ray
Necessary and suﬃcient
• air space shadowing on chest 
  X-ray, plus
• clinical signs of chest sepsis
 Fig 3.  Necessary elements of a sufﬁ cient set. 
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sidetracked by distractions around us or rumination about the 
cases just seen. We must also take account of the impact of our 
mood and our environment. 
 Data gathering 
 We have already considered the importance of gathering accurate 
information when taking a history. Even if our thought processes 
are optimal, there is a high possibility that an error will be made 
if the limitations of the data that we interpret are not appreciated. 
The following brief discussion focuses on laboratory data, but 
some of the principles equally apply to other tests. 
 First, there is always the possibility of a pre-analytical error. 
This incorporates issues such as: 
>  mislabelling of a blood sample 
>  inappropriate collection of a sample, eg blood being drawn 
from a ‘drip arm’ 
>  a technical issue with the sample, eg an air bubble in a blood 
gas syringe. 
 Analytical errors occur when things go wrong in the laboratory. 
Post-analytical errors are in the domain of the physician 
interpreting the test, and range from simple (eg transcription 
errors) to more complex (eg incorrect interpretation of a result 
due to a gap in knowledge). Reference ranges for parameters 
are often constructed in such a way that they will encapsulate 
results from 95% of healthy individuals. 5% of healthy people 
will therefore have an ‘abnormal’ result that is of no pathological 
significance. Similarly, a proportion of patients with disease will 
have a seemingly normal result. A correct comparison of a test 
result with a previous one should consider biological variability 
and imprecision in the laboratory. Knowledge about sensitivity, 
specificity and positive/negative predictive values of a test can be 
used to reach diagnostic conclusions with more certainty. 
 Thinking about thinking 
 Once we have the relevant information regarding the case, 
how do we safeguard our thinking processes? We need to 
have insight into the problems and be aware of how we think 
(metacognition). Then, as we make decisions, we need to reflect 
on the decision-making process, to be aware of biases and 
rushed system 1 errors. We can aim to develop our own clinical 
reasoning from the unreflective to that of the accomplished 
thinker. 16 We can use cognitive forcing strategies, such as 
structured review of data and diagnostic checklists. 22 We can 
also use resources to decrease dependence on memory. We 
can make ourselves accountable to the rest of the team for our 
thinking processes. ‘Thinking out loud’ on our ward rounds will 
allow others to follow our train of thought and permit challenge 
when our reasoning is flawed. Training tools, such as the One 
Minute Preceptor, can help our trainees develop thinking skills 
(and keep us fresh as we supervise them). 23 It is important too 
that we develop skills in error recognition and recovery. 24 
 Lastly, we return to the third of Pellegrino’s questions: what 
is the best solution for this patient? 4 Please excuse the pun, but 
the thinking doctor should also be the thoughtful doctor. Ballat 
and Campling prompt us to be attentive to the whole needs 
of the patient, to exhibit intelligent kindness, or, as has been 
said elsewhere, ‘one of the essential qualities of the clinician is 
interest in humanity, for the secret of the care of the patient is 
in caring for the patient’. 25,26 ■
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